Making Corruption Disappear in Local Government by Masters, A & Graycar, Adam
Archived at the Flinders Academic Commons: http://
dspace.flinders.edu.au/dspace/ 
‘This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:  
Adam B. Masters & Adam Graycar (2016) Making 
Corruption Disappear in Local Government, Public 
Integrity, 18:1, 42-58, 
DOI:10.1080/10999922.2015.1093400
which has been published in final form at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2015.1093400
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by 
Taylor & Francis in Public Integrity on 9 Dec 2015, available 
online:
 http://www.tandfonline.com/10999922.2015.1093400”
Copyright © 2015 
American Society for Public Administration
MAKING CORRUPTION DISAPPEAR 1 
Masters, Adam & Graycar, Adam (2016) ”Making corruption disappear in local 
government” Public Integrity vol. 18 (1), 42-58. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2015.1093400 
Making Corruption Disappear in Local Government 
Adam B. Masters 
The Australian National University 
Professor Adam Graycar 
The Australian National University 
Author note 
Adam B. Masters, Transnational Research Institute on Corruption, Research 
School of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Social Sciences, The Australian 
National University.  
Professor Adam Graycar, Director Research School of Social of Social 
Sciences, College of Arts and Social Sciences, The Australian National University. 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Adam Masters, 
Transnational Research Institute on Corruption, The Australian National University, 
Canberra, 0200 Australia. Contact adam.masters@anu.edu.au  
MAKING CORRUPTION DISAPPEAR 2 
Abstract 
Local government corruption is a phenomenon right across the world. This paper 
draws upon survey work in Victoria, Australia, to show that citizens believe that 
corruption exists in local government, that citizens experience corruption in local 
government, but that they rarely report it to an anti-corruption agency or elsewhere. 
Even when reported, tracing the outcome from state level authorities to the local 
government becomes and exercise in futility as the corrupt acts are dealt with in 
policy frameworks which makes it effectively disappear. As a result, corruption 
perceived or experienced in the everyday life of citizens is different to that defined by 
law and dealt with by public bodies – life and law seem to be two separate spheres. 
The paper suggests that survey data, particularly of experience of corruption, provide 
an important complement to official statistics on reported corruption. While the data 
here are Australian, the lessons and principles can be applied in many other countries. 
Keywords: Local government; corruption; integrity; bribery; perceptions; 
Australia 
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Making Corruption Disappear in Local Government 
Bribery is a well-known English word. Most people know what it means. Only 
the law has difficulty with it. (Roden, 1990: 615) 
Local government in one form or another exists throughout the world. It is the point 
of contact between citizens and those chosen from among them to administer public 
goods on their behalf. The day-to-day activities of local government provide services 
ranging from waste management to urban planning; child-care to cemetery 
management; road building to public art; and much more—all these activities should 
be delivered equitably in accordance with the applicable social standards.  
This paper draws on Australian polling data on a specific type of corruption—
bribery—at the level of local government and compares it to reporting and 
investigative data from anti-corruption agencies and courts. Survey data indicates that 
8.2% of respondents ‘or their close friends and family had come across a public 
official who hinted they wanted, or asked for, a bribe or a favour in return for a 
service in Australia’ and of these, 18.4% recalled the public official worked for local 
government. This makes the Australian position enviable with 98.5% of people not 
experiencing bribery-like corruption at local government level. However, 1.5% still 
represents more than 50,000 observations of local government corruption annually. 
This number should be treated with caution as sampling error alone could cause wide 
fluctuations. Furthermore, a single case of bribery, such as the one described in Box 2 
below would generate multiple observations. Although it is inadvisable to base public 
policy on these observations alone, 50,000 potential observations of bribery at the 
local government level should not be ignored.  
Our work focuses on Australia—a rich country with low-levels of corruption 
overall. Australia has a well-developed integrity system at both the national and sub-
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national levels (For an assessment of the national integrity system see Brown et al., 
2005). With such systems established, it is reasonable to expect attempts to elicit a 
bribe would be reported more often than not, however our research shows this not to 
be the case at the level of local government. Furthermore, despite a reasonable high 
levels of transparency, we find that determining the outcome of those reports actually 
made is nearly impossible. In effect, corruption seems to disappear. 
Background 
Corruption in local government is not a new phenomenon. The infamous 
Tammany Hall system in New York was essentially local (i.e. city) government 
corruption (see Gill Hearn, 2008: 56-57) and despite the best efforts in the richest 
nation on earth, local government corruption in New York persists to this day 
(Anechiarico, 2005; Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996; Graycar & Villa, 2011). Nor is 
corruption in local government simply enrichment by the most powerful actors at this 
tier. Even in wealthy countries, local government employees will ‘sell’ inequitable 
services for as little as a packet of cigarettes (see Box 2 below). Gardiner and Lyman 
(1978) found corruption in local government led to inadequate planning for schools, 
roads, water and recreation facilities; the construction of shoddy housing with high 
fire and safety risks, inflated prices for home buyers and other failures in the delivery 
of good governance to the local community. 
What is important is that corruption of this tier of government is often more 
likely to be experienced the citizenry than corruption at the more remote levels of 
regional or national government. Despite this, the focus of researchers, practitioners 
and the media is often on the more serious forms of corruption at the higher levels of 
government. For example, it is feared that new anti-corruption laws in Brazil will 
have little effect on local government corruption. The new law places responsibility to 
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investigate and prosecute corruption at the highest level of government concerned. At 
the local level, resources to conduct prolonged and complex investigations are much 
more limited than at regional and national level. Consequently, serious local 
government corruption may go unprosecuted (Jordan, 2014). Such experiences 
logically undermine overall faith and trust in democratic processes. 
In a recent poll, the number of people who though local government was not 
corrupt was 2 ½ more than those who thought it corrupt. The same poll showed local 
government being perceived as corrupt by nearly one fifth of citizens – a figure albeit 
lower than that of either the federal government (32%) or the state government (25%) 
(McAllister, Pietsch, & Graycar, 2012: 13). Comparing perceptions of corruption at 
different levels of government, the local variety comes out best, but the poll still 
indicates that more than four million Australians think their local government is 
corrupt. . These perceptions may be affected by both the level of media scrutiny and 
exposure and the extent to which ‘corruption’ is perceived to encompass 
distaste/disrespect/lack of trust in politicians. 
Perceptions of corruption differ from citizens’ experiences of corruption. 
Recent research has recognized the gap between perceptions of corruption and 
experiences of corruption (Bean, 2008; Clausen, Kraay, & Nyiri, 2011; McAllister, 
2014). Despite gaps between levels of perceptions and actual experiences—for 
example 86% of Russians believe public authorities are corrupt, yet only 23% of 
survey respondents say their household paid a bribe (Rose & Mishler, 2007: 1)—
relatively little work has been done to examine the gap between corruption 
experiences and action by the public to counter corruption. This second gap is 
important in the context of countries with well-developed integrity systems. While we 
do not expect any country to eliminate corruption completely, it is curious that 
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reporting to integrity agencies is at a significantly lower level than either perceptions 
or reporting to researchers. 
The absence of a national level anti-corruption agency with jurisdiction over 
all federal agencies makes it difficult to compare the gap between perception and 
reporting between the federal and state levels. It is much easier to measure the gap in 
jurisdictions like New South Wales (NSW) where a well-established anti-corruption 
agency exists. Yet even a cautious approach to the figure of 50,000 potential 
observations of bribery indicates the numbers simply do not add up—reports of 
bribery experiences far outnumber the reports made to state-level anti-corruption 
agencies and other authorities, let alone those cases actually prosecuted in court. What 
we find is that while corruption in the legal sense may only be the tip of the iceberg in 
the overall picture of unethical behaviour, there may be more above the waterline than 
originally thought. To complete the analogy, much of this corruption above the 
waterline melts away before it can be properly scrutinized. 
Recent research by us in Victoria, one of the latest states to introduce an 
independent anti-corruption agency, indicates a disparity remains between public 
claims to have witnessed corrupt conduct, and what is reported to anti-corruption 
bodies. Data from other states supports this. Based on the figure above of 1.5% of 
survey respondents ‘com[ing] across a [local government] official who hinted they 
wanted, or asked for, a bribe…’ we could expect up to 13,000 reports for bribery in 
Victoria (adult population=4.33 million). Similar calculations for NSW (adult 
population=5.55 million) would yield 16,600 reports annually. However, in NSW, 
only 33% of matters reported by the public related to local government (ICAC 2013). 
In raw terms, this is less than 1,000 reports, leaving a gap between observation and 
MAKING CORRUPTION DISAPPEAR 
 
 
7 
report of more than 15,000. Thus a considerable gap exists between observing and 
reporting of corruption. 
In this paper, we focus on corruption reports related to local government in 
Victoria and NSW – states with the newest and oldest anti-corruption agencies. By 
describing how these matters are handled from the State level down to the local 
council, we hope to further the understanding of why perceptions of corruption in the 
third tier of government persist at higher levels than reports of experiences, which in 
turn is substantially higher than the number of active steps taken to report bribery to 
authorities. 
Anti-corruption research 
The anti-corruption movement both inside and outside the academy has been 
steadily growing over the past three decades. Controlling corruption has been a core 
element of the global governance movement since its inception in the early 1990s 
(Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Finkelstein, 1995; Pope, 1995). 
Normative research, such as Transparency International national integrity system 
(NIS) and its metaphor of a Greek temple (Figure 1) is now used as an analytical 
framework to assess the institutional strength of anti-corruption systems of nations 
(Pope, 2000). Over 125 such national integrity system assessments (NISA) have been 
conducted since 2001(TI, 2012, 2014) in wealthy countries (e.g. Brown et al., 2005) 
and developing nations (e.g. TI, 2009). In the field of international development, anti-
corruption is used by the international finance institutions such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund as an indicator of good governance (Gray & Kaufmann, 
1998; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007, 2009; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-
Lobatón, 1999a, 1999b). This attention and the assessments have a (hopefully) 
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positive impact on the daily lives of citizens in the countries subjected to this type of 
scrutiny.  
 
Figure 1:  
National Integrity System 
(Pope 2000, p.35) 
Local government is an important place to research corruption – it functions as 
part of the legislative, executive and public service integrity pillars. The simple fact is 
in nations where government is multi-tiered, local government often has the greatest 
impact on the day-to-day lives of citizens and may therefore be to them, the most 
visible aspect of any system of governance. In Australia many functions of local 
government are located at the state level – police, schools and hospitals are all 
provided and administered by the states. In the rich countries of the developed world, 
corruption in local government has become the subject of a growing literature which 
often applies the NIS model (Pope, 2000) to local government (Huberts, Anechiarico, 
& Six, 2008; Huberts & Six, 2012), or foreshadows corruption as a growing problem 
in some countries such as Israel (Beeri & Navot, 2013) and Sweden (Erlingsson, 
Bergh, & Sjolin, 2008) even where the problem of corruption is considered generally 
to be under control. In the United Kingdom, ethical standards for local councils under 
the Local Government Act 2000 were introduced following a series of corruption 
MAKING CORRUPTION DISAPPEAR 
 
 
9 
scandals over the preceding decades (Lawton & Macaulay, 2014: 77). A decade later, 
the UK reforms were rolled back following the return of a national Conservative 
government wanting to remove bureaucratic and centralized control over local 
councils (Cowell, Downe, & Morgan, 2014; Lawton & Macaulay, 2014). The interest 
in corruption at the local level has only received marginal attention in Australia. 
Local government in Australia 
Australia is a federal parliamentary democracy with three tiers of government. 
The national level federal government; six state and two territory governments and 
local government with about 675 local councils (Warburton & Baker, 2005: 62). In 
2005, a NISA reviewed all three tiers of government (Brown et al., 2005). 
Contributors to the NISA examined the federal, state (NSW) and local government 
(Queensland and NSW) integrity systems (Roberts, 2005; Smith, 2005; Warburton & 
Baker, 2005). State level integrity systems have been further scrutinized in other work 
(Brown & Head, 2005), particularly in relation to NSW (Cripps, 2008; Smith, 2008), 
which led the way since the establishment of the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) a quarter of a century ago. Similarly, Queensland with a rich 
history of political and police corruption has been carefully scrutinized over the years 
(Prenzler, 2009, 2011; Whitrod, 2001; Williams, 1991), while Victoria has been he 
subject of more recent research (Graycar, 2014).  
Although Warburton and Baker reviewed local government in two States, the 
NISA did not centrally locate this tier of government. The NISA classified local 
government as a 'distributed’ integrity institution, as opposed to a ‘core’ integrity 
institution – regulated as opposed to being regulators (Brown et al., 2005: 12; 
Sampford, Smith, & Brown, 2005). Furthermore, Brown et al. (2005: 12)also  
classified government departments as distributed integrity institutions, though state-
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level departments responsible for local government such as the NSW Division of 
Local Government (DLG - formerly the Department of Local Government, now 
subsumed into the Department of Premier and Cabinet) and the Local Government 
Investigations and Compliance Inspectorate (LGICI) in Victoria provide a watchdog 
role for local government in Australia. Thus the delineation between ‘distributed’ and 
‘core’ integrity institutions is blurred. 
This blurring is further compounded elsewhere. A former ICAC 
Commissioner dismissed local council as having an ‘absence of real power’ other than 
‘a few relatively insignificant bylaws’ (Cripps, 2008: 20). This view is unsurprising as 
the ICAC is tasked with investigating ‘serious’ corruption. However, dismissing local 
government neglects the fact it is at this level many citizens interact most often with 
government. Council officers are some of the ‘street level bureaucrats’ described by 
Lipsky (1980)1, who can have immediate a serious impact on the daily lives of 
citizens. For example, a council ranger in NSW has broad discretionary powers over a 
person’s behavior (e.g. littering, vehicle parking, noise emission (e.g. parties and 
worksites), and use of firearms); their property (e.g. fire hazard clearance and 
property fencing); and even pets (animal control) (NSW Government, 1993, §.124). 
As a result, these officers have the ability to severely impact on a citizen/clients life, 
and are susceptible to consideration for favourable treatment.  
Despite the powers of local government are limited in the scheme of things, 
they are exercised in areas deemed to be of high risk to corruption. Gorta (2006: 209-
210) identified 15 high risk areas. Table 1 outlines Gorta’s high risk areas and their 
relevance to local government. 
                                                 
1 Many street level bureaucrats in Australia are employed at state level – police, teachers, court 
officials, nurses etc. There is no clean division as even the Federal government employs street level 
bureaucrats (e.g. Medicare), however the accessibility of council employees and elected council 
officials to the public place them all in this categorization for the purposes of this paper. 
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Table 1:  
Corruption risk with local government 
Risk Area Local govt activity 
1. inspecting, regulating or monitoring the standards of premises, businesses, 
equipment or products 
Yes 
2. providing a service to new immigrants Yes 
3. issuing qualifications or licences to indicate their proficiency or enable them 
to undertake certain types of activities 
Yes 
4. providing a service to the community where demand frequently exceeds 
supply 
Yes 
5. allocating grants of public funds Yes 
6. issuing, or reviewing the issue of, fines or other sanctions Yes 
7. receiving cash payments Yes 
8. providing assistance or care to the vulnerable or disabled Yes 
9. providing subsidies, financial assistance, concessions or other relief to those 
in need 
Yes 
10. making determinations/handing down judgements about individuals or 
disputes 
Yes 
11. testing blood, urine or other bodily samples from people or animals No 
12. having discretion concerning land re-zoning or development applications Yes 
13. selling tickets Yes 
14; undertaking construction Yes 
15. having regular dealings with the private sector other than for the routine 
purchasing of goods and services 
Yes 
  
Australian local government operates in all categories bar biological sampling. It is 
therefore clear this tier of government poses a high corruption risk. Having identified 
local government as an important arena for corruption research, we now turn to the 
available data for analysis.  
Estimating levels of local government corruption 
The problem often cited with using perceptions of corruption as a measure is a 
fundamental variance between what different people perceive as corruption. 
Perceptions of corruption can be broadly divided into two groups – illegal corruption 
and behaviour that while legal, generates distrust in the community (Pierce, 2014). An 
example of the former would be straight out bribery, whereas hidden political 
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donations may fall into the latter group. This research overcomes this problem in 
perceptions by focussing on bribery-type behaviour. The survey question—In the last 
five years, how often have you or a member of your immediate family come across a 
public official who hinted they wanted, or asked for, a bribe or a favour in return for 
a service in Australia?—removes any ambiguity between respondents’ perceptions of 
corruption and their experiences. This question has been fielded in 2007 (Phillips, 
Tranter, Mitchell, Clark, & Reed, 2007: B22) and 2012 (McAllister et al., 2012: 28). 
The latter survey followed up asking respondents whether they …remember[ed] what 
institution or organization the public official worked for? thus giving us a firmer 
number of experiences of bribery-like corruption.  
One of the fundamental problems of corruption research is definitional – what 
one person perceives as corrupt behaviour, another may interpret as ordinary politics 
or business. In the political sphere alone, Hindess (2003: 3-6) summarized the work of 
Philp (1997) within the Australian context in Box 1.  
Box 1: Five definitions of Corruption 
The conduct of public officials is said to be corrupt when: 
 It damages the public interest 
 Public opinion regards it as corrupt 
 It flouts legal norms 
 It deviates from the formal duties of office 
 Officials abuse their authority in order to maximise their income 
Source: (Hindess, 2003: 6) 
All these definitions are equally applicable to the three tiers of government. However, 
two of the definitions have particular significance for this research—public opinion 
regards the conduct of officials as corrupt and officials abuse their authority to 
maximise their income. The significance reflects the source of our data—public 
opinion—and the type of corrupt conduct observed—bribery. 
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Using recent poll data, we estimate the prevalence of bribery in the context of 
local government in Australia. We then compare this with official data from the 
agencies tasked with controlling corruption in local government in NSW and Victoria, 
Australia’s two most populated states. The official data is broken down into types of 
corrupt behaviour, the activities corrupted, the sector affected and places where it 
occurred. Graycar and Sidebottom (2012) developed this method, referred to as 
TASP, as a tool to formulate context specific corruption control options. Table 2 
presents the four dispositions of the TASP model. 
Table 2 
Corruption typology: Corrupt behaviours in four dispositions  
Classification Description 
Type Bribery, Extortion, Misappropriation, Self-dealing, Conflict of interest, Abuse of 
discretion, Patronage, Nepotism, Cronyism, Trading in influence, Pay to play, etc. 
Activity Appointing personnel, Buying things (procurement), Delivery of programmes or 
services, Making things (construction / manufacturing), Controlling activities 
(licencing / regulation / issuing of permits), Administering (e.g. justice), etc. 
Sector Local government, Construction, Health, Tax administration, Environment and 
water, Forestry, Customs and immigration, Welfare systems, Agriculture, Urban 
Planning, Legal systems, etc. 
Place Countries, Regions, Localities, Cities / Towns, Organisations, Workplaces, etc. 
 Source: Graycar and Sidebottom (2012: 386); Graycar and Prenzler (2013: 11) 
 
Of all the types of corruption listed above, bribery is the least ambiguous. The 
receipt by public officials of cash, goods, services or favours beyond their official 
salary in exchange for preferential treatment—treatment that is either lawfully 
required or breaches the law—is clearly corrupt behaviour under any of the 
definitions offered by Hindess above. 
Corruption reported in local government 
Within Australia there are a number of anti-corruption agencies at state and federal 
level. However a brief look at their annual reports reveals far lower levels of 
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corruption as opposed to a relatively high level of matters that fail to meet public 
expectations, yet do not meet the legal definition of corruption.  
Table 3 
Integrity violations and NSW ICAC matters 
Violation Description 
NSW ICAC Descriptors (% of 
total referrals)a 
Corruption: bribery Misuse of public powers for private gain; 
asking, offering or accepting bribes 
Bribery, secret commissions and 
gifts (8%) 
Corruption: 
nepotism, cronyism, 
patronage 
Misuse of public authority to favour 
friends, family, party 
Other corrupt conduct (6%) 
Fraud and theft Improper private gain acquired from 
organization (no involvement of external 
actors) 
Improper use or acquisition of 
funds or resources (12%) 
Conflict of (private 
and public) interest 
Personal interests (through assets, jobs, 
gifts etc.) interfere (or might interfere) 
with public interest 
Personal interest (13%) 
Improper use of 
authority (for noble 
causes) 
Using illegal/improper methods to achieve 
organizational goals 
Corrupt conduct related to 
investigations or proceedings 
(6%) 
Misuse and 
manipulation of 
information 
Lying, cheating, manipulating 
information, breaching confidentiality of 
information 
Improper use of records (19%) 
Discrimination and 
Sexual Harassment 
Misbehavior toward colleagues, citizens 
or clients 
Partiality (19%) / intimidating or 
violent conduct (6%) 
Waste and abuse of 
resources 
Failure to comply with organizational 
standards, improper performance, 
incorrect or dysfunctional internal 
behavior 
Failure to perform required 
actions (10%)/ improper use or 
acquisition of funds or resources 
(12%) 
Private-time 
misconduct 
Conduct in one’s private time that violates 
moral norms, harms public trust 
Category not mapped to ICAC 
data 
(Huberts & Six, 2012, p.160; ICAC, 2013: 87) 
a. Total percentages exceed 100% because the same matter can address multiple forms of conduct. 
 
For example, in NSW, the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC) received some 2,930 matters from the public or government agencies in 
2012/13, from these 71 preliminary investigations commenced and only 22 moved on 
to full investigations; during the year, only 19 prosecutions eventuated from these and 
previous investigations (ICAC, 2013: 9, 16, 25). These figures represent a bare 
fraction of 370,000 state and local government employees in NSW (DLG, 2010; 
ICAC, 2011, p.9; NSW Government, 2011). Two things are clear from this data. 
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Firstly, there is a large gap between what is reported as corruption and what is treated 
as corruption. Secondly, there is a broad range of ethically or morally deficient 
behaviors that do not meet the integrity standards of those members of the public 
reporting matters to the ICAC. Similar disparities between corrupt activities and other 
misbehavior can be found with the NSW Ombudsman (2011), and research by 
Huberts (2012, pp.4-5) also showed a low level of strictly corrupt behavior in the 
context of the Netherlands police, local government and US companies. Huberts’ 
integrity violations categories compared to NSW ICAC classification and data can be 
seen in Table 3 above. 
Table 4:  
ICAC investigations of serious local government corruption in NSW 1989-2013 (n=34)a, b 
Type   Activity  Sector   Corrupt people 
Bribery  
(incl. 5 attempts) 
Nepotism, cronyism, 
favouritism, patronage 
Conflict of Interest 
Misappropriation 
Trading in influence 
Abuse of discretion 
Info/material misuse 
Discrimination 
Pervert course of 
Justice 
Blackmail 
25 
 
11 
 
6 
5 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
 
1 
Permits 
Procurement 
Licencing 
Making 
things 
Appointing 
personnel 
Elections 
Service 
delivery 
18 
8 
3 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
2 
Urban planning 
Waste management 
Sex industry 
Politics 
Construction 
Forestry 
Local government  
19 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
8 
Elected officials 
Public 
employees 
Private 
individual 
21 
45 
 
88 
Placesc  Main actors  
Sydney metro 
Other metro 
Rural 
Public authorities 
Parliament 
21 
3 
12 
1 
1 
Developers 
Council officials 
Council workers 
Business owners 
private 
individual 
Nil corruption 
14 
8 
2 
2 
1 
 
7 
Source: Developed by authors from ICAC website data on past investigations (ICAC, 2014). 
a. Numbers of type, activity, sector and people exceed 34 as multiples can occur in any given case 
b. No corruption findings were made in seven of these investigations. 
c. Operation Jarek investigated only 15 of 110 public authorities (88 councils) – see Box 2 below. 
 
The ICAC has completed 34 investigations into serious corruption involving 
local government since 1989. Of these cases, 25 involved some form of bribery or 
attempted bribery. Due to the ICAC focus on serious corruption, these cases usually 
MAKING CORRUPTION DISAPPEAR 
 
 
16 
involved property developers who stood to make significant financial gains from the 
right type of approval, as reflected by the number of developers under the main 
actors’ category and the issue of permits as the activity being corrupted. Of those 
people found to be corrupt by the ICAC, 88 are private individuals, outnumbering 
public officials (66) by precisely a third. The relatively low numbers in the above 
table are not always indicative of the extent of bribery in local councils. Box 2 below 
provides a case study illustrating how widespread a single case of bribery-like 
corruption can be. 
Box 2: Case Study NSW ICAC Operation Jarek 
The ICAC investigated allegations that staff from 14 local councils and another public authority 
engaged in corrupt conduct by accepting gift vouchers and other gifts from suppliers as an inducement 
to continue placing orders with their companies or as a reward for placing orders with the companies. 
Evidence from the suppliers indicated this practice occurred in 88 local councils and 22 other public 
authorities. Given the finite resources of the ICAC, investigations were only conducted in selected 
councils. 
The Commission found that 22 employees or former employees of 14 local councils and another public 
authority engaged in corrupt conduct by accepting gifts from suppliers as an inducement to continue 
placing orders with their companies or as a reward for placing orders with the companies. Fifteen staff 
from four supplier companies were also found to have engaged in corrupt conduct through their 
involvement in offering these gifts. 
The ICAC also found that two former council storepeople, and three suppliers engaged in corrupt 
conduct in relation to false invoices issued to two councils in return for cash kickbacks in excess of 
$323,000. 
Source: (ICAC, 2012) 
At the time of writing, the Victorian Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption 
Commission (IBAC) has only been fully operational for a year and there is 
insufficient data to tabulate serious local government corruption in the State at this 
point. However, two cases of alleged local government corruption have been 
investigated and another into cemetery administration—technically not local 
government, but a very local activity. Bribery allegations featured in two of these 
investigations, with one case being found and before the courts and the other 
unsubstantiated.  
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Other corruption reported in local government 
Resource issues keep the ICAC and IBAC focussed on serious corruption. However, 
as the case of Operation Jarek demonstrated, corruption in local government is often 
at a level of seriousness that is insufficient to trigger a major investigation. These 
cases are dealt with in NSW by the Division of Local Government (DLG) and by the 
Local Government Investigations and Compliance Inspectorate (LGICI) in Victoria. 
Although data specific to bribery is not readily accessible from these authorities, the 
overall profile of complaints to action by the agency matches those of the ICAC and 
IBAC. In 2012-13, The DLG resolved 1051 complaints about NSW local government. 
Of these, 592 were resolved through the provision of advice or an alternate recourse 
to the complainant, in 162 cases the DLG had no utility, 78 cases were deemed trivial 
or outdated, 58 matters were noted for future monitoring and 49 were determined to 
be resolved. Of the remaining 102 complaints, 85 were referred to either the relevant 
local government Council or another agency for investigation. The DLG only 
investigated 11 matters and the DLG Chief Executive determined misbehaviour had 
occurred in 6 instances. Of these final 15, only four matters went before a tribunal 
(DLG, 2013). In Victoria, the LGICI lists all its prosecutions since 2009 (n=32), 
however not one was related to bribery, despite this being the authority to which such 
allegations should be made (LGICI, 2014). 
Hidden numbers – council’s dealing with bribery 
An alternative to reporting bribery to dedicated anti-corruption agencies is to report it 
directly to the council itself, especially if the bribe is being solicited by a lower level 
council employee. Dependent on the seriousness of the matter, these corrupt events 
can be dealt with administratively by council. The problem for researchers is that such 
administrative action can become hidden even when reported in the minutes and 
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reports of (hundreds of) local councils. Furthermore, such records may reflect terms 
such as misconduct or maladministration rather than the more serious expressions of 
bribery and corruption. 
Box 3: Case study: Extra services rendered 
According to a member of the public, an employee of a local council was providing extra waste 
collection services to a small business in the area in exchange for cigarettes, food and drinks. The 
Commission was also informed that the council employee had been using the council truck to collect 
garbage from the business, despite the business not paying the council for the additional service. On 
one occasion, the council officer allegedly abused a staff member of the small business after having 
been given a smaller packet of cigarettes rather than the larger packet he usually received. 
Under s 53 and s 54 of the ICAC Act, the Commission referred the allegations to the local council and 
directed it to report its findings to the Commission. The council concluded that there was information 
to indicate that some improper behaviour had occurred, but there was no information to indicate that 
the issue was systemic or that it involved high-value items or monetary amounts. The council decided 
not to terminate the employee’s employment, but to implement preventative measures. The employee 
was also removed from the council’s waste collection area and his performance was monitored. 
Source: ICAC Annual Report 2012-13: 24. 
Box 3 presents a case study from the ICAC annual report (2013: 24). This 
single case was observed by multiple people—the business owner, the staff member, 
ICAC and council staff, the reporting member of the public and quite possibly other 
customers—yet only one reported the matter. In official statistics of the ICAC and 
presumably council2 this matter is recorded. However, if it had been reported directly 
to the council, or a private contracting firm working for council, the disciplinary 
action may still have occurred, but then remains hidden in council minutes, personnel 
files or the records of the firm. For example, Blacktown Council was recorded by the 
DLG as having 3 instances of public interest disclosures about being made in  
2012-13. No details of what occurred is available from either the DLG or the Council, 
both simply report statistical data (Blacktown City Council, 2013; DLG, 2013). It is 
also plausible that language used in the disciplinary proceedings is not that of 
corruption scholars, lawyers and anti-corruption agencies. Dismissal of an employee, 
termination of a contract or other proceedings can be attributed as a failure to 
                                                 
2 The council is unnamed. 
MAKING CORRUPTION DISAPPEAR 
 
 
19 
perform, rather than act corruptly. Evidence of councillors being removed from office 
in the United Kingdom ‘without full investigation and adjudication’ for fraud and 
flouting planning regulations has been presented by Cowell et al. (2014: 33). Under 
such circumstances, local government corruption can remains hidden. 
Court proceedings 
The firmest data available on bribery is the number of persons charged and the 
charges preferred in court for bribery offences. Official crime statistics from Victoria 
and NSW indicate that between 2000 and 2012, 275 bribery offences were recorded 
by the Victoria Police (VicPol, 2012), and in NSW 501 bribery offences were charged 
against 272 people resulting in 105 convictions (BOCSAR, 2012). These figures fall 
well short of the expected observations noted above. Hence observations make an 
acceptable alternative to legal data, which is not necessarily created, maintained or 
kept accessible with the researcher in mind. Research that makes the assumption that 
the measures such as the Corruption Perceptions Index can be substituted for hard 
data is valid—simply because even countries with the best integrity systems cannot 
prosecute every instance of corruption, even when the law is clear cut as in the case of 
bribery. We would not assume a survey respondent in India would lie about being 
asked for a bribe, so why would we make such an assumption in a high-income 
country? Quite simply put, prosecutions are not indicative of the prevalence of 
corruption. 
Discussion 
So the question remains, why are the reported levels of corrupt behaviour in discord 
with the number of observations reflected in survey data?  The answer is multi-fold. 
To begin with, many people simply do not want to get involved. As Gorta and Forell 
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(1995) demonstrated, government employees need to make a series of decisions in the 
affirmative before they would report a corrupt act; this from the group entrusted by 
society to administer public goods. Our survey of Victorian public servants (n=839) 
indicated over half (56%) would only report corruption on the basis of hard evidence. 
The projected observations calculated above would, at best only constitute hearsay 
evidence of corruption. 
Focus group research conducted by the authors in 2012 reflected similar 
concerns that strong evidence is required before reporting corruption: 
If I suspected it and I had nothing to prove… they’d hang up and just go ‘oh 
yeah, we’ve got another prank caller’ (Group 3 young adults) 
Other concerns raised by the focus groups regarding any decision to report corruption 
included: the danger of repercussions; the likelihood of outcomes; the severity of the 
case; need for anonymity; and understanding the situation and one’s rights.  
Once a decision to report corruption is made, uncertainty about where to 
report it follows. The focus groups discussed reporting matters to the media, police, 
local government, Ombudsman or the public authority in which the corruption had 
occurred. However, it was apparent across the groups that the primary concern 
relating to reporting corruption was the lack of certainty and knowledge regarding 
actions that could be taken by an individual. There was a general sense that people did 
not know where they could turn to report corruption in the public service: 
That’s the thing – you’d like to be able to know who to turn to. (Group 2 
Families)  
I wouldn’t know where to go. (Group 3 Young Adults)  
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If you’re willing to take it up with someone, I mean sure, you can spend half 
an hour looking it up on the computer and then go from there. (Group 3 Young 
Adults)  
I think it boils down to the fact of, you know, who would you report it to and 
who would believe you? You know, probably nothing is going to happen in the 
end anyway, so why bother? (Group 5 Families Outer Metropolitan) 
or who they could trust in doing so: 
The problem there is that you don’t know whether the next level that you’ve 
got to complain to is also in on it. I think that is a problem and then if there’s 
likely something going to happen to you that is unfavourable. (Group 1 
Retirees)  
Once we wouldn’t have even thought of it, you’d just go straight to the 
police… you’ve got to stop now and think, that are they to be trusted? (Group 
2 Families)  
My biggest concern is my lack of faith in it… And whether my anonymity if 
that’s required will be held… Or whether the person that I’m reporting to isn’t 
a mate of the guy, or the person that I’m reporting about. You know, there’s 
those sorts of faith that – losing faith. And that would be the biggest thing in 
my mind. (Group 6 Regional)  
Who watches the watchers? (Group 6 Regional). 
Consequently, the notion that people needed to be informed about the best ways to 
report instances of corruption was expressed. 
The above factors coalesce to diminish the number of bribery type activities 
actually reported. Furthermore, resource limitations noted in the ICAC and with 
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police and judicial services further erode the number of cases actually prosecuted. 
Finally, the element of collusion between briber and bribed further camouflages the 
observations noted above. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we show how data on corruption goes through a series of reductive 
processes – from perception to observation; observation to reporting; from high level 
agency to local agency; and finally from the hard language of allegation to the often 
softer approach to administrative action following investigation – which for the 
researcher and public at large make many acts of corruption apparently disappear. 
Thus it is plausible local government corruption is closer to the levels reported in 
survey data than those revealed in the official reports of anti-corruption bodies. While 
this paper does not argue all observations translate into individual corruption events, it 
does argue perceptions may be a useful gauge for policy makers. 
We cannot write a rule for everything, nor can we enforce every rule to the nth 
degree—even when it is expected by those who are governed. Administratively 
treating every integrity violation as corrupt conduct in the manner it is perceived by 
the public may be the equivalent to using a sledgehammer to crack a walnut. The 
competing values of effectiveness and efficiency in public administration may temper 
the enforcement of the values of incorruptibility. This results in what Grindle (2004) 
described as 'good enough' governance in the developing world, a description that 
Evans (2012) found applicable in the Australian governance context. 
Adding an extra level of reporting for local government would go some way to 
satisfying the need for better data on corruption. However, the current status quo 
would seem to reflect that instances of corruption are being appropriately handled 
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once a relevant authority (local government, police or anti-corruption agency) is 
informed. Better data reporting would simply add a layer of confusion and 
bureaucracy to the local integrity system without any tangible gains. To illustrate, if 
the case outlined in box 1 above had been only reported to the Council, who one 
could expect to deal with it as they did, be handled any better if time was taken by 
council officials to analyse whether it is, or is not, corruption in a legalistic or 
academic sense and then report it up? Furthermore, the instances of observed but 
unreported corruption at the local level would continue to go uncaptured by any such 
additional reporting measure. In this case, we think the warning of Anechiarico and 
Jacobs (1996) not to over bureaucratize in the pursuit of absolute integrity applies. 
As a final observation, the data reviewed here are calculated on a specific 
question about bribery-like corrupt activity. There remains plenty of other amoral 
activities in the corruption spectrum—nepotism, cronyism, conflict of interest, 
extortion, self-dealing, misappropriation, abuse of discretion and trading in 
influence—just to name a few. However, bribery gives some solidity to the nature of 
corruption in that it is a criminalized activity with universal recognition.  
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